the Review Conference mandate pitted states that sought a focus on implementation against those that aimed to bring new issues into the PoA framework. 10 Among the Review Conference casualties was agreement, of any kind, on further PoA meetings. Subsequent sessions of the General Assembly First Committee filled this gap, however, with decisions to convene a third biennial meeting by 2008 and a second review conference by 2012 (UNGA, 2006a, para. 4; 2008d, para. 14).
Preparations for BMS3 got under way early, with the designation of the chair in December 2007 and the identification of three topics for focused consideration in early 2008. The selection of specific meeting themes contrasted with the wideranging-and ultimately unproductive-discussion format favoured by BMS1 and BMS2.
11 BMS3 also distinguished itself from its predecessors by reaching agreement on a substantive outcome that fleshes out skeletal PoA text on international cooperation and assistance, brokering, and stockpile management and surplus disposal (UNGA, 2008b). 12 In the more divisive climate prevailing after the 2006 Review Conference, the outcome was adopted by vote. • cooperation between states, including at the regional level and comprising such activities as the exchange of information and experiences; the harmonization of legislation, practices, and tools; and joint action (UNGA, 2010c, paras. 4, 7, 11-12, 15);
• cooperation and coordination among different authorities responsible for border control within a state (paras. 7, 11, 13, 16);
• capacity building (paras. 8, [13] [14] ; and
• the need to take into account related activities, including trafficking in drugs and precious minerals, organized crime, and terrorism (paras. 5, 8). The 'way forward' section also encourages states to ensure that the prevention of small arms trafficking figures among their priorities for national border management (para. 13). As customs authorities around the world tend to place arms smuggling relatively low on their list of concerns (Wurche, 2010) , implementation of this recommendation could make a considerable difference to small arms control efforts world-
wide. Yet such advances also presuppose stronger linkages between the UN small arms process and other relevant actors, such as the World Customs Organization.
Although the border control section covers the bases, its language, even in the 'way forward' part, is entirely non-prescriptive.
The section presents a series of options and best practices for border control; it does not require-or even push-states to do anything about their borders. Other 'way forward' sections of the BMS4 outcome, such as those in the BMS3 document, are also largely cast as recommendations ('States are encouraged to . . .'), rather than firm commitments. Yet, in contrast to this other text, the lack of specificity, even clarity, 14 in much of the border controls language leaves the impression that UN member states are entirely 'off the hook' in this area.
International cooperation and assistance
International cooperation and assistance was a theme at the Third Biennial Meeting of States, with language in the BMS3 outcome covering, in some detail, the matching of needs and resources, needs assessment by recipient states, and national reporting. 15 The challenge at BMS4 was to build upon-rather than simply repeat-this text.
The BMS4 section on international cooperation and assistance recaps many of the BMS3 priorities, including those mentioned above, 16 but in each case there are one or more new elements. In relation to the matching of needs and resources, the BMS4 outcome makes a link to regional efforts, citing a potential role for the UN regional disarmament centres (UNGA, 2010c, paras. 30j-k Yet the key value added in the BMS4 international cooperation and assistance section lies elsewhere. First, the BMS4 section puts greater emphasis on cooperation, 'including joint or coordinated action', than does its BMS3 counterpart (UNGA, 2010c, para. 30a). 18 This could help rebalance discussions of PoA Section III, 19 since the issue of cooperation, despite its critical importance to Programme implementation, 20 has often been eclipsed at UN small arms meetings by its more appealing twin ('assistance'). Second, the BMS4 outcome, building on text agreed at BMS3
(UNGA, 2008b, outcome, para. 7c), highlights the need to assess the effectiveness of cooperation and assistance (UNGA, 2010c, para. 30e). 21 This emphasis on effectiveness is the logical follow-up to BMS3 discussions that focused on improved identification, communication, and matching of needs and resources. Strengthening the delivery of assistance is one challenge; ensuring that states measurably benefit from such assistance is another. Finally, the adoption of the BMS4 outcome by consensus, including its affirmation of the BMS3 text on international cooperation and assistance (UNGA, 2010c, para. 29), means that states that had balked at the latter 22 are now bound by both BMS3
and BMS4 outcomes.
Follow-up
While the BMS3 outcome addresses the question of PoA follow-up, much of the relevant text is tucked away in the document's 'other issues' section and thus lacks the normative strength found elsewhere, in particular in its 'way forward' sections. 23 The UN General Assembly's 2008 omnibus resolution incorporated several elements of the BMS3 outcome's 'forward-looking implementation agenda for the Programme of Action' (UNGA, 2008b, outcome, para. 29), especially in the area of national reporting, 24 but it is the BMS4 outcome that does most to elaborate upon the PoA's basic provisions for follow-up (see Box 2.1). This was the first PoA meeting with a dedicated session on follow-up. 25 The BMS4 outcome sets out the following parameters for PoA follow-up:
• a six-year cycle for biennial meetings of states and review conferences (UNGA, 2010c, para. 44);
26
• no agreement on whether MGEs should be part of the six-year cycle, following the first in May 2011, but an acknowledgement that they 'had a potential role to play in [the PoA] implementation architecture' if adequately prepared and 'action-oriented' (para. 32);
• early designation of the chair of a PoA meeting-if possible, one year in advance (paras. 34, 45);
• '[i]n order to ensure continuity among meetings,' collaboration between the chair of a PoA meeting and the chair and chair-designate of the previous and following meetings (para. 45);
• 28 In line with evolving practice for PoA reporting, the 2010 outcome also encourages states 'to submit their reports well in advance of biennial meetings and review conferences' (para. 10d). In addition, the outcome recognizes, in veiled terms, the value of converting paper-based records into electronic form (para. 4b); encourages the development of legislation providing for the mutual exchange of information and intelligence, which is useful for tracing (para. 10g); and underlines, somewhat more forcefully than its BMS3 predecessor, 'the important role that civil society plays in promoting the full implementation of the International Instrument' (para. 10i). 29 Fundamentally, however, the 2010 ITI outcome is enfeebled by omission. Four-and-a-half years after the 
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Elements from BMS4
The small arms omnibus resolution duly endorses the BMS4 report, including the outcome, and 'encourages all States to implement, as appropriate, the measures highlighted' in the 'way forward' sections of the report. It also contains, in a footnote, a reference to paragraph 23 of the main BMS4 report, 39 which, as noted earlier, reflects the dissatisfaction of some delegations with the lack of line-by-line discussion on the draft outcome (UNGA, 2010g, para. 4).
The omnibus resolution includes several paragraphs on international cooperation and assistance, some of which emphasize, in line with the BMS4 outcome, the need to ensure their effectiveness (UNGA, 2010g, paras. 15, 26). Other
First Committee resolutions focus to a greater extent on the question of assistance. 40 Following up one of the key themes of the BMS3 outcome, the 2010 resolution on 'practical disarmament measures' emphasizes the contributions of the Group of Interested States 41 and UNODA (its Programme of Action Implementation Support System) to the matching of needs and resources for PoA implementation (UNGA, 2010h, paras. 5-6).
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2011
The omnibus resolution includes a vague reference to the border controls question (UNGA, 2010g, para. 16). The resolution also mentions the International Tracing Instrument, but without borrowing from the 2010 ITI outcome; 42 it makes greater use of the BMS4 outcome on follow-up. National reporting on the PoA, including use of the ODA reporting template, is the subject of three paragraphs (paras. 11-13), while another cites the BMS4 proposal to create a voluntary sponsorship fund for enhanced PoA meeting participation (para. 21). There are several omissions from the BMS4 follow-up text, 43 although, as with the lack of specific reference to many other parts of the BMS4 text, they
are not important given the resolution's endorsement of the BMS4 report (and outcome) as a whole (para. 4).
The The omnibus resolution transforms this provision into a somewhat confusing exercise in self-assessment. The
General Assembly:
Invites Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the progress made on the implementation of the Programme of Action, ten years following its adoption, and requests the Secretary-General to present a report containing that information as an input to the 2012 review conference (UNGA, 2010g, para. 29).
Strictly speaking, states are invited not merely to report on the progress they have made in implementing the PoA, but on progress made in general ('the progress') since the instrument's adoption in July 2001. It is highly unlikely that many (any?) states will want to report on a lack of progress by other countries. In practice, it appears that states are being asked to indicate the progress they have made in implementing the PoA over the full period of its existence in the national reports they submit in advance of the 2012 Review Conference. Critical, independent analysis of PoA implementation is not yet on the UN agenda, it seems.
Future meetings
The 2010 omnibus resolution also devotes significant space to the post-BMS4 schedule of PoA meetings. It sets the dates for the MGE (9-13 May 2011) and, echoing the BMS4 outcome, underlines the importance of 'pragmatic, actionoriented [. . .] agendas for the meeting' (UNGA, 2010g, para. 8). 44 In essence, the MGE should involve an exchange of information and experience among small arms experts, not a political debate of the kind that has featured in many several Friends of the Chair, 59 were devoted to informal (that is, closed) 60 consideration of possible treaty elements in three substantive areas:
• scope;
• common standards or criteria for the import, export, and transfer of conventional arms; and
• implementation and application. The first PrepCom session was generally welcomed as a successful start to the ATT negotiations. 61 After two years of unspecific, often repetitive discussions in the GGE and OEWG, the PrepCom's focus on the nuts and bolts of treaty-making was heralded, in some quarters, as an indication that the ATT had finally gained universal acceptance.
62
Yet while the 2010 PrepCom was certainly successful in highlighting many of the critical issues for the negotiations, there was no convergence of views-let alone specific agreement-on any of these issues. 63 From statements made throughout the first PrepCom session, it is clear that several countries remain opposed to any ATT that would constrain the decision-making of exporting states or the ability of importing states to secure continued supplies of conventional arms. The tactics have changed-there was minimal outright opposition to an ATT at the 2010 session-but the objective has not. Despite the fact that the papers produced by the Friends are 
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simply compilations of the national positions and proposals made at the session, several countries took issue with them during their closing statements. In some cases, this appeared to signal an intention to hinder progress at the next stage of the negotiations. 64 The disagreements go beyond questions of principle (such as constraints on national decision-making) 65 to many matters of critical substance (such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms as a basis for treaty scope). Even points that seemed to have been generally accepted at earlier stages of the process-such as the inclusion of small arms and light weapons in any ATT-were called into question during the 2010 session. The incorporation of ammunition in the ATT remains hotly contested, despite its centrality to arms control. 66 In short, the first PrepCom session was successful in nudging the process, however gently, towards formal treaty
negotiations; yet the real work is still to come. As of January 2011, despite attempts to reconcile differences following the 2010 session, 67 there were no signs of convergence on key aspects of the treaty, including the desirability of an effective ATT. The negotiations promise to be exceptionally complex, but there is relatively little time. The July 2010 session accounted for half of the PrepCom's allotted four weeks. 68 The four-week 2012 Conference is unlikely to produce anything of value unless existing gaps between countries are substantially narrowed beforehand.
A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW
In July 2011, the UN Programme of Action celebrates its tenth anniversary. What is the significance of the developments described in the last section to the longer-term UN small arms process? This section seeks to place the events of 2010 in the broader context of PoA-related activity over the past decade. It first examines the process of translating the PoA's general norms into more specific prescriptions for action, then considers the extent to which the PoA (and ITI) are in fact spurring any 'action'.
Unpacking the PoA
While the PoA provides a general framework for the regulation of small arms and light weapons, it does not substi- These documents cover the following areas:
• marking, record-keeping, and tracing (ITI, BMS3 and BMS4 outcomes);
• brokering controls (2007 brokering report, BMS3 outcome);
• stockpile management and surplus disposal for weapons and ammunition (BMS3 outcome, 2008 ammunition report);
• border controls (BMS4 outcome); and
• international cooperation, assistance, and national capacity building (BMS3 and BMS4 outcomes).
The chapter briefly examines each of these areas.
Marking, record-keeping, and tracing as noted above, is even more timid in its treatment of the ITI and ITI implementation.
Brokering controls
Brokering was the second issue, along with tracing, which was singled out for priority attention in the PoA. 72 The main PoA para- The BMS3 outcome reiterated several key points from the 2007 brokering report, such as the need for 'a comprehensive approach' and 'the crucial importance of international cooperation' to these efforts (UNGA, 2008b, outcome, paras. 11, 16c). Above all, it 'acknowledged the importance' of the report's recommendations and other findings (paras. 11, 16b), a conclusion reinforced by the General Assembly's repeated call for states to implement the GGE recommendations. Ammunition, although essential to effective regulation, has received scant attention in UN small arms agreements.
Except when referring to other documents, the PoA makes no mention of ammunition, 76 and this category was deliberately excluded from the ITI-a development that led directly to the establishment of a GGE on surplus ammunition stockpiles. 77 The Group's July 2008 report situates the problem of surplus ammunition stockpiles-for all conventional weapons, not just small arms-within the broader framework of stockpile management, addressing such issues as marking, accounting, public safety, stockpile security, and disposal and destruction (UNGA, 2008a). 78 Many of the report's recommendations apply to the management of arms as well as ammunition. As of January 2011, a set of 'technical guidelines', designed to complement the 2008 report, were being developed by UNODA. 79 
Border controls
Despite its weaknesses, noted earlier in the chapter, the BMS4 outcome on border controls usefully develops the limited text found in the PoA. Among the basic elements of border control it lists are cooperation and coordination between and within states, capacity building, and-not least-the need to integrate the prevention of small arms trafficking into national border management strategies. For the time being, we are left with these general principles.
A proposal by some UN member states to discuss the issue of border controls in greater detail, at the 2011 MGE, was abandoned in the face of opposition by other states.
International cooperation, assistance, and national capacity building
Early consideration of PoA implementation, specifically at the First and Second BMSs, underlined the importance of cooperation, assistance, and national capacity building for this purpose, but in fairly general, non-specific terms; no attempt was made to build upon the provisions of the PoA. 80 At BMS3, and again at BMS4, this discussion became more focused-as reflected in the outcome documents of the two meetings. At BMS3, states considered practical means of improving the identification and communication of needs, along with the matching of needs with resources (UNGA, 2008b, outcome, sec. I). 81 As noted above, the BMS4 outcome, while echoing these points, stresses the
Box 2.2 International Small Arms Control Standards
In parallel with the recent efforts at normative development involving UN member states, the UN system's Coordinating Action on Small Arms-or CASA-mechanism has undertaken its own standard-setting initiative. The creation of a comprehensive set of International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) is modelled on the UN system's prior development of technical standards for mine action and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. The ISACS project aims:
to develop a set of internationally accepted and validated technical standards that provide comprehensive guidance to practitioners and policymakers on legal, policy and operational issues surrounding small arms control (UNGA, 2010e, para. 35).
The ISACS modules are drafted by technical consultants, with inputs from a wide range of experts and practitioners. As of January 2011, 26 modules were in development, with the adoption and launch of final versions planned for late 2011.
importance of cooperation-not just assistance-in implementing the PoA. It also highlights the need to ensure the effectiveness of cooperation and assistance (UNGA, 2010c, sec. II).
The view at ground level
The development of detailed guidance for PoA implementation should, in theory, help ensure that the commitments states have made in the PoA find practical expression 'at ground level'. But that raises the question of what is known about implementation. A 2010 UN report presents a wide range of activity on small arms, specifically in Africa, the Americas, and Europe (UNGA, 2010e). 83 In some cases this 'activity' involves meetings and discussions. 84 In others, it is more concrete-such as strengthening controls or sharing information for operational purposes. 85 Not all of the news is good, however. 86 Moreover, the report describes many activities that are proposed or planned, not under way or completed.
Most of the information on the implementation of the PoA and ITI comes from national reporting, which is rarely self-critical. Despite encouragement over recent years to share information on 'implementation challenges and opportunities', 87 states are providing relatively little information on the difficulties they encounter in giving practical effect to the two instruments-except to note, usually in general terms, a lack of capacity or need for assistance. 88 Independent evaluations of PoA implementation have consistently pointed to serious weaknesses. 89 Most recently, the Small Arms Survey sought to determine whether information states had provided to UNODA on their national points of contact for the PoA was accurate and, further, whether the NPCs were operational (Parker, 2010, pp. 26-33) . 90 The results are not encouraging. The existence and identity of the NPC could be confirmed in only 52 cases-just over one-quarter of the UN membership (p. 32). 91 The establishment of an NPC is a relatively simple task 92 -the designation of a government official to serve as a liaison on PoA-related matters and the communication of their contact information to UNODA. It serves, in other words, as an indication of some minimal willingness on the part of the country to take its PoA commitments seriously.
The current picture of PoA and ITI implementation is quite sketchy; visibility 'at ground level' is very limited. The information states offer in their reports does not, as a whole, include the level of detail that would permit a clear determination of whether specific commitments are being fulfilled-even allowing for the imprecision of many PoA provisions (Parker, 2011) . What is clearer, thanks to independent research, is not encouraging. Baseline indicators of political commitment to the PoA (NPCs) and the ITI (reporting rates, information exchange) are flashing red. These admittedly limited assessments give the distinct impression that the UN small arms process is nothing more than a 'paper tiger', limited to declarations of good intent.
The impression that there is little more to the process than paper is reinforced by the UN membership's continuing aversion to any formal assessment of implementation. The guidelines for PoA implementation, described above, are a start in developing a set of 'benchmarks' that could be used for the systematic assessment of implementation.
Much more could be done to develop the measurability of the PoA. 93 The critical obstacle is perhaps not the development of such benchmarks but, more simply, the acceptance of independent measurement. Self-assessment of the kind promised in the 2010 omnibus resolution can be meaningful when the assessor is serious about fulfilling its commitments under the relevant instrument. It is wholly insufficient when the real intention is to get on with 'business as usual' and ignore the instrument.
The UN, or civil society, or some combination of both could fulfil the monitoring and evaluation role, preferably with a mandate from UN member states. The greater the trust that monitored actors have in such an exercise, the greater the chance they will act on the results of any evaluation. 94 With or without a UN mandate, however, independent scrutiny of PoA (and ITI) implementation appears long overdue. 95 The BMS4 outcome recommends that the issue of strengthened PoA follow-up be put on the 2012 Review Conference agenda (UNGA, 2010c, para. 49). Such a move would indicate that the UN membership is poised to take the issue more seriously in the coming years. Yet member states' failure, in the 2010 omnibus resolution, to authorize an independent assessment of implementation in advance of the 2012 Review Conference suggests the opposite.
CONCLUSION
A decade after the adoption of the PoA, it is not clear that the UN small arms process has changed much at 'ground level' in terms of concrete implementation. There were, to be sure, some modest successes in 2010 at the diplomatic level. The BMS4 outcome document contributed to the operational guidance for PoA implementation that has been developed in recent years. It also sketched out a more elaborate, and potentially effective, follow-up process for the PoA, extending beyond mere reporting to the focused consideration-and assessment-of reporting.
Nevertheless, 2010 also saw persistent indications that most UN member states are not following through on their 96 It is admittedly difficult to draw firm conclusions based on the limited information that is currently available, but the UN membership's reluctance to embrace independent scrutiny of PoA (and ITI) implementation suggests it has a case to answer.
It is too soon to write off the UN small arms process. It is possible that the 2011 MGE and 2012 Review Conference will provide clear evidence that the UN membership, as a whole, is committed to the concrete, practical work of strengthening small arms control-and submitting such work to independent evaluation. Yet we may also be approaching the point at which the UN small arms process is widely seen as inadequate, paving the way for non-UN initiatives, whether global or regional, that are more ambitious in their design and effective in their implementation. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

5
See the discussion of the follow-up section of the BMS4 outcome, below.
6
This provision was also referenced in the small arms omnibus resolution. See UNGA (2010g, para. 4, n. 5).
7
The PoA encourages trans-border customs cooperation and information-sharing at the subregional and regional levels (UNGA, 2001, para. II.27), as well as the exchange of experience and training among customs, police, intelligence, and arms control officials for purposes of combating the illicit small arms trade (para. III.7). The BMS3 outcome also mentions the issue of border controls (UNGA, 2008b, outcome, para. 7b).
8
The various elements of PoA follow-up are mentioned in UNGA (2010c, para. 32).
9
The two-week Review Conference was preceded by a two-week Preparatory Committee session.
